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Despite a timid recovery in growth after the global financial crisis, the economic crisis in the European 
Union is far from over, and the effects of the crisis continue to linger. Real GDP in the fourth quarter 
of 2016 in the EU was only 5% higher than in the first quarter of 2008, showing a remarkable 
stagnation for a region used to steady (if unimpressive) growth. The situation in the Euro area has 
shown even less progress, as nearly every country in Western Europe using the euro has stagnated 
significantly since 2007, with countries in the south of Europe such as Greece and Spain seeing 
unemployment exceeding 25%. For all intents and purposes, economic growth in the European Union 
came to a halt as a result of the crisis, with only a few countries such as Poland showing signs of 
resilience. 
Growth was not the only casualty of the global financial crisis. Indeed, and somewhat ironically, the 
leap forward in European integration that was the euro may have sowed the seeds of the demise of 
further integration. In addition to the impact of the global financial crisis, Europe plunged directly 
into an ensuing sovereign debt crisis, a crisis which exposed the incapability of existing European 
institutions in dealing with economic problems of this magnitude. While a common currency had 
been put into practice, legal and regulatory framework deficiencies, combined with the weakness of 
the euro project itself, created severe difficulties in crisis response. In particular, as Wyplosz (2014) 
notes, politicians were forced into the role of micromanaging solutions which were usually taken care 
of by professional bureaucrats. This injection of more politics into a situation already somewhat 
attributable to national policies made managing the crisis even more difficult.  
As already noted, part of the issue plaguing the EU was the euro itself. When individual countries 
gave up their own currency, they not only facilitated trade and capital flows and reduced transaction 
costs, but they also gave up the possibility of monetizing their debts. Without any mechanism 
guaranteeing sovereign debts under a common currency area, this created a ticking time bomb. It is 
well understood that financial crises tend to work as self-fulfilling prophecies even if justified by the 
fundamentals, and the slightest loss of confidence might spark a disaster (Cole and Kehoe, 2000). If 
anything, such an eventuality was underestimated during the pre-crisis period, which was marked by 
a striking convergence of interest rates on government bonds of EU Member States. Simply put, the 
issue of an individual country facing a sovereign debt issue under a common currency was never 
entertained, given that convergence appeared to render such a possibility moot.  
Underpinning this assumption was the belief that membership within the European Union and 
subsequently in the Euro Area would necessarily be accompanied by more prudent fiscal policy, an 
assumption backed by mechanisms such as the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) or the `No Bail-Out 
Clause.’ Moreover, the aforementioned inability to monetize debt would also impose a hard-budget 
constraint, forcing countries to face an upper limit both on debt and deficits. However, with the Greek 
crisis underway, it becomes clear that these assumptions could be readily discarded by the political 
pressures inherent in each Member State; mechanisms such as SGP sword were not sufficient to force 
countries into fiscal rectitude, and the euro itself might encourage profligacy with the implicit 
guarantee of a bailout. Once financial markets realized that countries such as Italy, Spain, Ireland, 
Portugal and even France had taken on unsustainable sovereign debts, the nature of the euro 
guarantee was testes, as interest rates on government bonds soared.  
Not only did the pre-crisis institutional mechanisms appear to fail, but the lack of a legal framework 
for debt-restructuring, an issue which quickly became apparent, also exacerbated the crisis once it was 
underway. Greek debt was restructured ad hoc and Zettelmeyer et al. (2013) argue that the process 
surrounding it might make future debt restructuring in Europe even more difficult. Moreover, the 
debt crisis appeared to have accelerated centrifugal forces in the EU, with the question of Greece 
leaving the Euro Area or even the European Union became plausible. Politicians and economists had 
to admit that such measures that our understanding of how this would work was not sufficient 
(Athanassiou, 2009), another indication that the institutional framework was not well thought-out. 
The surprise decision of the UK for “Brexit” and the rise of populism in 2016 came as additional 
destabilizing factors, issues which not only prevented closer integration but which could induce 
disintegration in Europe.  
Facing the lack of political will and the threat of full-fledged self-fulfilling debt crisis, European 
leaders promptly created the European Financial Stability Facility and the European Financial 
Stabilisation Mechanism, followed by the European Stability Mechanism. Founding of these 
mechanisms was far from easy and in fact remained quite contentious at the political level; to take an 
example, the Slovak Prime Minister was forced to resign as she was unable to obtain the necessary 
support in her own government for these mechanisms.  Worse still, despite these stability 
mechanisms, the EU did not enjoy any respite and, in fact, integration began to be managed by 
unelected bureaucrats rather than politicians. In 2012, Mario Draghi crossed the line between 
monetary and fiscal policy with his `whatever it takes` and creation of the Outright Monetary 
Transaction programme.  Saka et al. (2015) argue that it was only this measure which managed to 
calm the markets, but the consequences remain to be seen.  
These events, and especially the effect that they have had on the “ever-closer union” in Europe, are the 
animating reason for this special issue of the Journal of Economic Policy Reform, a journal which is 
known for tackling policy issues of contemporary interest. What are the prospects for European 
integration after the debt crisis, and how are the different facets of Europe’s economic and political 
system affecting this process? Are the proposed solutions to the EU’s institutional issues appropriate, 
or, as Burns et al. (2017) show, are they another manifestation of fragmentation in the Union, driven 
by interests in each Member State? The papers in this issue have been culled from separate events 
hosted by organizations in which the guest editors are involved: the first, the INFER Workshop on 
European Integration in the Aftermath of Debt Crisis, took place in Slovakia in March 2016, while the 
second, the Center for Social and Economics Research’s (CASE) 25th Anniversary Conference on the 
Future of Europe, took place in November 2016 in Warsaw. Most importantly, the papers collected in 
this special issue have been selected for their unique approach to the myriad of issues which the EU, 
growth, and socio-economics on the continent face in particular.   
The papers can be loosely grouped into three thematic areas: policy uncertainty, effects of and 
responses to the last crisis, and predicting the next crisis. The first paper from Christopher Hartwell 
builds on the current literature in economic policy uncertainty to show how political volatility in the 
new EU countries and countries on the EU periphery fed through to financial volatility, suggesting 
that political changes have economic consequences. Paloviita and Ikonen also touch upon the issue of 
uncertainty, showing that government budgetary and macroeconomic forecasting errors have grown 
in Europe since the global financial crisis. Shifting to crisis responses, the paper by Soukiazis et al. 
applies a twin-deficit approach to model economic growth in Slovakia (one of the faster-growing 
transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe), highlighting the potential growth limitations 
associated with internal and external imbalances; their results suggest that crises can be avoided via 
appropriate competitiveness policies and price stability. Coming back to the role of the financial 
sector, Roman Horvath focuses on the fragmentation of financial markets in the EU, and how such 
fragmentation has reduced the effectiveness of monetary policy responses throughout the Eurozone. 
Finally, in regard to predicting the next crisis, Siranova and Radvansky evaluate the performance of 
individual early-warning indicators included in the EU’s Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) 
framework, concluding that a parsimonious set of indicators is most effective in predicting imbalances 
for the future. In the concluding, and perhaps most provocative piece, Alberto Bagnai argues that a 
monetary union such as the Eurozone may actually be the source of macroeconomic divergence, 
creating capital misallocation and harming countries on the periphery.  
Taken together, these papers address a topic of significance whose results will only be seen in time. 
However, the policy implications of these various pieces of research should be heeded in helping to 
design the next round of institutional responses, as well as the need for better-formulated policy 
mechanisms. The overall conclusion of these papers is that integration may not be finished, but it 
cannot continue in the manner in which it has been proceeding.  
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